American Journal of Political Science (2023) [Paper]

(with Milan Vaishnav)

Abstract: National security crises often generate a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect, especially under nationalist administrations, but the salience of a security crisis varies within a country. Does exposure to a crisis intensify rallying by fomenting nationalism, inciting hawkishness, and distracting from quotidian economic concerns? Or does exposure deepen dissatisfaction with the incumbent, thereby reducing a rallying effect? We argue the latter using evidence from a difficult test in India. A major pre-election terrorist attack boosted the nationwide popularity of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the nationalist ruling party. Yet we find that proximity to the victims’ funeral processions, which served as patriotic rallies, substantially reduced BJP support where the party was incumbent. The size and breadth of our observed effects indicate that the social commemoration of the attack, rather than direct personal connections to its victims, fuelled anti-incumbent sentiment. Mobilizing collective anger after a crisis may dampen rather than augment a rally-around-the-flag effect.

International Organization (2026) [Paper]

(with Ken Schultz)

Abstract: Scholars and policymakers have argued that territorial revisionism is dangerous because it risks setting off a cascade of claims by states dissatisfied with their borders. This Pandora’s box logic suggests that states that are vulnerable to an unraveling of the status quo have incentives to restrain their territorial ambitions to preserve stability. This paper explores this claim theoretically and empirically. It provides descriptive evidence to determine whether vulnerability to territorial threats has historically been associated with a lower likelihood of initiating territorial disputes. We find some evidence of such an effect in postindependence Africa, where this logic is most frequently invoked, and to some extent in Asia, but not in other regions. To help explain these empirical observations, we develop a multistate model of territorial conflict that identifies the conditions under which cooperation to preserve the territorial status quo can be sustained. The model shows that while an equilibrium of mutual restraint can exist, the necessary conditions are quite restrictive, and this cooperative equilibrium is never unique. Thus while a Pandora’s box of potential claims can provide the basis for a norm of restraint, the emergence of such a norm is neither straightforward nor guaranteed.

Under review.

Abstract: Two foundational views underpin research on the reach of African states and their services. First, state infrastructure is perennially sparse in rural hinterlands. Second, leaders narrowly funnel public goods into co-ethnic regions. But there are few comprehensive and granular empirical assessments of these views, since there is a dearth of data in regions of limited state presence. This paper documents African state expansion by applying machine learning methods to sixty terabytes of satellite imagery, identifying and dating the construction of government schools in a quarter million rural African villages—and government clinics, for a smaller sample—over the past thirty-five years. The findings from this panel dataset challenge conventional wisdom. While disparities in the presence of public infrastructure remain, historically neglected regions are “catching up” in virtually every country. Further, there is little evidence that ethnoregional favoritism significantly distorts public facility allocation. These results suggest a need to reformulate the politics of state expansion in Africa.

Draft available upon request.

Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of “hollow state expansion,” in which states significantly broaden the territorial reach of public facilities but leave them nearly devoid of staff and supplies. Hollow expansion is a puzzling strategy, as it is expensive and unpopular. Why do states engage in hollow expansion, and how do they manage its political fallout? This paper answers these questions with two original surveys and survey experiments, administrative data, and qualitative evidence from Uganda, an archetypal hollow state. First, planned corruption produces hollow expansion. State decision-makers build facilities to embezzle public funds in collusion with contractors, providing little for facility operations. Second, rent seeking reshapes distributive politics, as marginalized peripheries become desirable sites for extraction. Third, leaders can divert blame for hollowness onto leakages and negligence by local middlemen. Petty larceny provides political cover for grand corruption by the hollow state.

Draft available upon request.

Book manuscript that is currently under construction itself.